Indragnir has asked me to post his latest campaign here at the Blitz for you all.
The file is attached and has to be unzipped into the Korea '85 Directory. All new artwork, the scenario, order of battle and players notes is included.
For reference here are Cesar's notes of all inclusions and changes below. please note the transfer to the forum has resulted in some layout issues;
By César Librán Moreno (“Indragnir” at The Blitz)
Many years have passed since Korea 85 game was released, it received a quality revision by Volcano Man that improved the original Stock campaign. Since then new information and researchs have surfaced. This mod is a Variant based on the Main Campaign scenario with new sources and research applied.
Alternative Assault Resolution Recon Spotting
Virtual Supply Trucks Blocking Helicopter Termination
Indirect Fire and Airstrikes by the Map Counterbattery Fire
Higher Fatigue Recovery Programmed Weather Quality Fatigue Modifier Delayed Disruption Report
ROKA = Republic of Korea Army. FROKA = First ROKA.
TROKA = Third ROKA.
ROKAF = Republic of Korea Air Forces. MOBRES = Mobilization Reserve.
USFK = United States Forces Korea. DMZ = Demilitarized Zone.
NKPA = North Korea People's Army.
PTU = People's Training Units (Reserve Divisions.) ADA = Air Defense Artillery.
SSM = Surface to Surface Missile. SF = Special Forces.
SP = Self-Propelled.
ATGM = Anti-Tank Guided Missile.
NKPA invasion plan and the subsequent plan to keep control over the penninsula clearly stated that all main ports must be occupied to stop any heavy forces landing like they did at Inchon. So going for the ports (specialy Pusan, off map) is the main target. Seoul could be isolated and later taken.
Both goals are needed for the NK player to win. For the South Korean player to win he needs to recover all the lost terrain while keeping casualties even.
NKPA relies on massive firepower and shock troops, they have numbers advantage but not like Stock/ALT (116% more man power in Stock/ALT vs roughly 40% in VARIANT) the south relies in the powerful airforces to degrade advancing troops, supply routes, reinforcements, hunting the deadly artillery and the arrival of US divisions plus the ability to coordinate the Marine divisions landings with the US I Corps for counterattacking if he decided to.
No use of SSM to deliver artillery mines. (FASCAM)
Artillery mines cannot be used to isolate units and then assault them. Attack helicopters cannot be used to clear congestion.
Helicopters in T mode cannot end their movement atop bridge sides or in roads nor can be used to isolate units.
ROKAF counter-terrorism aircrafts cannot be used north of DMZ.
As said above, by 1985 NKPA had 38% more personal than ROKA. Stock/alt scenario had 116% because stock-ALT missing divisions and divisions having 6 infantry Btls instead of 12 they really had.
seems based upon a tweaked Factbook released by the CIA and the USMC in 1997, however NKPA by 1985 had little resemblance to NKPA in the 90s.
For example by mid 80s NKPA started a massive reorganization and build-up: From 1985 to 1992 they added up 1000 tanks, 2500 APC/IFV, 6000 Artillery tubes/MLRS reaching a 2;1 advantage in tanks and artillery (1.5:1 in personel) despite massive ROKA growth.
NKPA had no Mechanized and Armored Corps, They had a Mechanized Command with: 3x Motorized Rifle divs, 2x Tank divs (Yu Kyong-Su's 105th Seoul Guards div [commander of the division when they conquered Seoul in the 50s] and Koksan div), 5x Tank Bdes 2x Independent Tank regt. It was by 1989 when III, VI and VIII Corps would be converted into.
NKPA had no Artillery Corps (that has control over Air Defense along of DMZ) but 2 Artillery Divisions (620th
and Kangdong) with plenty of Artillery brigades with no Air Defense responsibilities.
NKPA Corps had ground holding responsibilities and were to the rear (those were the ones that would become future Armored and Mechanized Corps) while the attacking “Corps” were called Army Groups and were better equipped (more modern weapons, more guns, more support from Special Forces.)
NKPA Special Forces had less than 80.000 personel vs more than 100,000 by 1990.
NKPA Special Forces.
They were divided in Diversionary and Attack roles. The first ones are not in the OoB, their effects are through Scenario conditions and PDT effects (See Second Front
in Scenario below.
Attack SF are treated like shock troops. They are elite and thus reflected in their stats, also being SF type they use all SF associated traits and some more to reflect their training and ability to move through the battlefield. (See OOB
The attack tunnels were the best way to use SF and in this scenario you can expect a lot of SF pouring out from the tunnels, so beware.
Changed Swamp terrain from -40% to +20% Changed Field terrain from 0 to -10%
Changed Elevation Modifier from -10% to -20% (see below)
Movement Elevation Mod raised from 10 to 20. (see below)
(Korea is a really mountainous land, I want to reflect the capital importance of height terrain) Changed Artillery Hard Target Mod from 1 to 2. (80s artillery had already powerful AT munitions)
Changed Quality Fire Mod from 1 to 1.5 (making veteran divisions more powerful, there are few in this scenario, also impacts SF combat)
Stacking lowered from 1800 to 1350. (Avoiding the über stacks of death) Max Road lowered from 800 to 600.
ROK-USFK Air Interception raised from 15% to 75% (see below)
NKPA Air Interdiction lowered to 1% from 5% (see below)
(NPKA ground attack and Interception capabilities were rather weak, with only good weather aircrafts (see NKPA OoB), no night capability and unable to night interception, older models with limited TAS and payload, outdated Control systems and not very good Radars. By 1985 even their SAM defenses were quite lacking. This is reflected also in the Air Interception / Interdiction.)
NKPA Electronic Warfare lowered to 2% from 5% (Their EW by 80s was very poor.) Rubble fire value raised to 10.000 from 1.000.
Side A & B replacements set to 0 from 1. (Gold feature as default, just reverted to normal)
ROK-USFK lowered Counterbattery mod to 100. (ROK had a significative weakness in their Counterbattery radars and practices.)
ROK-USFK raised Indirect Fire Mod to 125 from 100 (They implemented a computerized firing program at battery level.)
NKPA raised Stockpiling from 0 to 5% (Depots had enough for 1 month of high intensity warfare in reserve) ROKA-USFK at 1% form 0.
NKPA raised Artillery Setting Up from 80 to 90. (Artillery is the main strength of NKPA) ROK-USFK lowered Recovery from 5 to 1. (Both sides uses Replacements at OOB level) Dust spotting of 5 for both sides. (Simulates intel gathering including SF surveillance teams) Tracked MP cost raised in Soft and Mud conditions.
ZOC Movement modifier set to 25. Units should be able to move at least 1 hex in ZoC.
General relocation of both sides.
ROKA and NKPA artillery and HQs start in TRENCHES.
Raised NKPA Supply sources to 90 from 70. NKPA had big underground supply depots calculated enough for a month of high intensity war.
Supply sources are distributed to allow for some City fighting.
New VP locations and Victory levels. The NKPA plan called for a total ocupation of the South to stop any US-led heavy divisions repeating Inchon landings. ROKA will try to hold as many land as it can until the US counterattack starts.
ROKAF and USAF enter the battle from turn 2. Additional USAF aircrafts in subsequent turns. (see
Second Front below.)
Supply drops for both sides. ROKA-USFK due the first day shock. NKPA have 3 drops (separated by about a week, just when additional USAF enter the battle) that simulate the air campaign against NKPA infrastructures, supply centers, industry, moving targets etc.
Both sides have new SAM Sites. Raised the minebelt strength.
ROKA-USFK Reinforcements and Strategies.
The lead Brigade must be on the ground by C+2 (172nd
Light Infantry Brigade, was assigned as the "Division Ready Brigade" for Pacific contigencies, and was available within 48 hours of alert by air transport.), the lead Divisions by C+12.
No withdrawl for 7th
Fleet fire Support. NKPA had no SSN-2 Styx until after 1985, their submarine fleet wasn't that dangerous by that year and ROK Navy would have grind them down after two weeks of battle.
Added strategies for a combined Marine landing and for the 172nd
North Korea wouldn't invade the South firing WMD if that means USA would retaliate both North and South of the parallel, despite some claims about initial WMD attacks to disrupt defenders, that wouldn't work when US forces were permanently at DEFCON 4 with plenty (and dispersed) systems to deliver even nuclear strikes. Western analyst by 80s believed NK would use them but defectors from NK told a different story. NK elite didn't want to live in a nuclear / chemical wasteland.
The primary objective of North Korea's military strategy is to reunify the Korean Peninsula under North Korean control within 30 days of beginning hostilities. A secondary objective is the defense of North Korea. To accomplish these objectives, North Korea envisions fighting a two-front war. The first front, consisting of conventional forces, is tasked with breaking through defending forces along the DMZ, destroying defending forces, and advancing rapidly down the entire peninsula.
This operation will be coordinated closely with the opening of a second front consisting of SF units conducting raids and disruptive attacks in the rear.
Despite by 1985 NKPA IV Corps was not located in the DMZ for the purpose of an aggression scenario I put them in the DMZ like it would be by 1989.
NKPA Strategies: [Note USFK are permanently at DEFCON 4.]
By 1985 NKPA had only 3 amphibious Btls. Even worse they had no capacity of delivering 3 amphibious brigades, for example their hovercraft were not available until 1990. They had 126 light craft (no heavy equipment), from those 95 can carry up to 19 passengers, (not even mention sustained operations supplies) and only 8 landing crafts capable of transporting 4 light tanks. Barely enough for transporting their 3 Btls using a fleet of more than 100 Landing Crafts, a big and easy target easy to locate and attack. NKPA Navy had very weak Electronic Warfare & SIGINT, very limited foul weather and night operativity, null air defense, poor ASW, very limited capacity of amphibious rear landings and defense of their own coast. No doubt ROK Navy would have plastered them.
Their plan was to support the campaign in the East Coast (opposite to Seoul and Japan bases) with a small landing to support the breakthrough achieved in the East, inserting SF to isolate or blocade retreating ROK forces.
“In terms of equipment, the North Korean Navy is no match for its ROK counterpart, and it would be suicidal for it to undertake an offensive mission against the ROK Navy. If it can deny the ROK control of the sea and assist in the landing of infiltrators and play its part in combined operations, it will have fulfilled its role.”
For the purpose of Aggression Scenario I give them more strategies: Sokch'o (the east coast) Kanghwa island in the west coast.
By 1985 there were only 5 Airborne Btls in the NKPA. Their AN-2 fleet didn't allow transporting more than a simple squad of 8 men per aircraft, the rest of air transport fleet (provided they wouldn't be located by the radars, ground watching systems, air patrols, DMZ patrols, intelligence or satellite) was rather small: best case 100% readiness, not counting supplies, they could field 10 AN- 24 (up to 500) 5 IL-14 (up to 150) 4 IL-18 (up to 480) just 2 Btls per maximum effort.
For the purpose of Aggression Scenario I raised their capacity from 2 to 5 Btls. The drop options are
Imjin river, Kanghwa island or Sokch'o in the east coast.
NKPA smuggled 84 MD500 helicopters and painted them as ROKA colors. They also had a small fleet of very light helicopters, so there is a SF attack Btls called MD500 Infiltrators that can be deployed to support Kanghwa island
amphibious-air drop operations.
The tunnels were not wide enough to allow even the lighter vehicle drive through them. The widest of the 4 found tunnels had 6 foot diameter. Only foot infantry and light weapons could be used in them. Tunnel exit very sharp slopes would prevent any heavy equipment also.
The troops using those tunnels would be the Recon bureau and the Light Infantry brigades (which despite their name are all Special Forces). ROK and US estimated that a full regiment of infantry could traverse the tunnels in a single hour. In this scenario SF will use those tunnels in full force: in the first two turns up to 5 SF Btls, first wave is composed by SF attached to Infantry divisions (thus able to direct artillery fire form the division) and Recon Btls from VIII Special Corps. The second wave is composed by Light Infantry Brigades at Corps Level.
NKPA should be aware of Light Brigades HQ radius.
Smuggled and camouflaged helos, SSM fell onto HQ, devastating long rage artillery fire, their limited EW adding whatever jamming they could, sleeper cells (200-1000 terror agents as per ROK intelligence), plus any air chaos NKPA could muster, could be enough to infiltrate SF teams in the rear causing as much havoc as possible.
The massive infiltration by NKPA SF is represented outside of the OoB by:
-ROKAF-USAF enter in battle by second turn.
-Corps and Army HQs are Disrupted at the start.
-All non DMZ Infantry divisions artillery in the DMZ area is unavailable.
-Congestion hexes that slow the reaction of ROKA.
-Delayed releases of troops.
-A supply drop for the first day.
That is why all ROKA Homeland Defense units (Including the full Second ROK Army) and all Military police, Security Rgts/Btls and Counter-Terrorism Btls plus the 201st
Special Assault Brigades are not in the game, they are just fighting against NKPA SF infiltrators (along Second ROK Army.) and guarding the coast vs infiltrations (post turn 1.)
Note: Despite it's not in the game Second ROK Army (or Rear Area Command) is responsible for defending the rear area extending from the rear of the front area to the coastline, Has operational command over all army reserve units, the Homeland Defense Force, logistics, and training bases located in the six southernmost provinces.To deter North Korean ground, surface, or air invasion has the task of coast guard during both peace and war time, and of protecting the sea lines of communications. Also, it is in charge of managing mobilization materiel and reserve forces. It defends the 3,276-mile coastline. IX Corps is responsible for coastal and rear area defense of North and South Kyongsang Provinces, while XI ROK Corps is responsible for coastal and rear area defense of North and South Chungchong and North and South Cholla Provinces.
Second ROKA (stock and ALT) is in reality Third ROKA, the second ROKA was a coastal formation called Rear Area Command with IX and XI corps. (See above)
General tweaking of units values to reflect their intended role and limitations.
Most combat Infantry from both sides are now a single Btl unit instead of companies.
I integrated regimental assets into Btls so now ROKA infantry have a slight advantage in anti-tank firepower both at Btl and Rgt level (slightly more AT tubes and a little better penetration. NPKA had RPG-7 but this weapon had a 22% of hitting at 300mts, only 9% at 400 meters. ROKA had LAW.)
NKPA regiments have advantage in firepower (as per their doctrinal plan) since their regiments had a 18 strong 120mm mortar Btl plus a 9 strong MLRS Type 63 (107mm) battery (a full Btl for the forward Corps, those formations still had their 2 Type 63 Btls in the artillery Rgt) vs 12 strong ROKA 107mm mortar company.
ROKA had 25 M-18 and 50 M-36 in their inventory (!) NKPA had some 300 T-34/85, IS-2 and SU- 85/100 but those obsolete tanks were in the very reserve formations, for ROKA those would be used against the “second front” and the NKPA will send them to guard their coasts and land frontiers plus key centers. (as well as some 76.2mm ZIS-3 M1942) so they are not in the scenario.
SF forces have TIS trait to simulate their deadly night attacks. Anphibious to simulate their mobility and lightness.
Notice SF don't have DECEPTION trait. The role of SF is finding and “painting” Headquarters and artillery for airstrikes and long range artillery, surveillance, blowing bridges, blocking key terrain and general figthing specialy under night cover.
Added, when known, formations nicknames.
Replacements added with greater emphasis on men (2-4%) than on vehicles / artillery (1%)
All TOW units under every brigade are removed, Infantry Divisions usually had 12 per Div, Btls were equipped with Recoiless Rifles weapons (106mm) by 1985.
ROKA had 680 M48A5K2 (105mm gun & LTFCS ) 380 M48A3K (90mm gun) and 460 M47, that means all TROKA had a mix of M48A3K-A5K, while the older M47 were assigned to FROKA.
ROKA had 4482 guns vs 4200 NKPA, [NKPA had more than 2000 MLRS while ROKA had 156, plus double number of mortars 5.300 vs 11.000.]
860 KH-179 (conversion of M114A1, longer range) 988 M114
2000+ M101 (All variants)
105mm and 155mm towed Btls are now 24 strength instead of 18.
MLRS strength per Btl decreased to 16. MLRS by 1985 had a maximum range of 14 miles. The Korean 155mm (a bit more than half of the inventory) had a longer range than the M114.
Divisions I found nothing about them, however I found the 1st
Divisions, so one Infantry Division was missing.
All infantry brigades from Infantry Divisions had Regiments with 4 infantry Btls instead of brigades with 2 infantry Btls.
Most of the Vulcan AA were towed (1000 towed vs 263 SP.)
USFK gave ROKA 16 SAM Btls by 1982 (4 Hawk, 12 Nike-Hercules) These Btls were factorized into unit AA values.
All quality raised to C. Corrected strength and type (there were 352 F-5 in stock.) The ROKAF ground attack inventory was by 1985:
68 F-4D/E Phantom.
6 A-10 Thunderbolt. 233 F-5E (Tiger II).
Counter-terrorist forces: 23 OV-10 Bronco.
23 A-37B Dragonfly.
Recon aicratf totaled 44 instead of 20.
Missing and Corrections on Formations.
All armored brigades were missing their Recon, Engineer companies and ADA SP Battery.
A lot of Corps assets were missing, mainly ADA, Engineers (brigades not Btls), Special Forces, ATGM elements and in some cases separate armor Btls.
Missing Aviation Operations.
Air Assault Brigade with 4x infantry Btls heliborne.
Aviation Brigade half of it's MD-500D TOW attack helicopters.
Missing Special Forces.
1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th, 11th, 13th Special Warfare Brigades, 701st, 702nd, 703rd, 704th, 705th, 706th, 707th and 708th Special Assault Regiments, Special missions Btls 62nd and 707th
Note some Special Warfare Brigades are attached to some Corps. Others are under the Special Warfare Command.
Missing Regular Formations.
FROKA troops: 11th
Infantry Division and 3rd Armored Brigade. VII Corps: Capitol Mech Inf Div that was under this missing Corps.
Capitol Defense Command: 6th
Marine Bde (-) and 101st
Separate inf Bde.
Missing MOBRES Divisions.
Stock and ALT have 2 MOBRES Divs but none of them are shown on my sources. I found out 11 MOBRES by 1985 and none of those has the same numeral than stock ones. Another two were created by 1987. That's a total of 9 MOBRES mising. (See General.)
Missing Capital Defense Command.
A Corps-size command with the 60th
MOBRES Divisions, Corps troops: 1113rd
Engineer Brigade, 2x SF Btls, Seoul Air Defense Artillery Brigade (L40/70 40mm, GDF-003 35mm, includes static 20mm Vulcans on highrise building roofs in Seoul.)
Corrected TROKA artillery: (T means towed) Under TROKA were 51 non divisional artillery Btls, 32 only in stock/alt.
1 Field Artillery Group (1 x 155 SP Btl , 1 x 175 SP Btl , 2 x 155 T Btls)
2 Field Artillery Group (1 x 203 T, 1 x 155 SP Btl , 3 x 155 T Btls)
3 Field Artillery Group (1 x 203 SP Btl , 1 x 203 T, 1 x 155 SP Btl , 1 x 175 SP Btl , 1 x 155 T Btl )
5 Field Artillery Group (2 x 155 SP Btls, 2 x 155 T Btls)
6 Field Artillery Group (3 x 155 SP Btls)
7 Field Artillery Group (4 x 155 T Btls)
8 Field Artillery Group (4 x 155 T Btls)
9 Field Artillery Group (5 x 155 T Btls)
Engineer Brigade. 1173rd
Air Defense Artillery Brigade.
Mobilization Forces: 61st, 65th, 66th and 75th MOBRES divs.
---Capital Corps (Do not confuse with Capital Defense Command)
Special Assault Rgt. 1175th
Separate Infantry Brigade (with Armor Co M-48A5K, Reconnaissance Co, 5x Infantry Btls Field Artillery Btl 105mm.) The only independent brigade by 1985.
Artillery Brigade (they had 1 x 130mm MLRS Btl , 3 x 155 T Btls.)
Marine Div: artillery all 155mm towed. They had regiments (1st
) with 3 Btls instead of brigades with 2. Quality raised to B for all sub-formations.
Special Assault Regiment. Separate Armor Btl.
Air Defense Artillery Btl,
3x Anti-tank Co's (jeep mounted TOW)
Artillery Brigade (1 x 130mm MLRS Btl , 2 x 175 SP Btls, 2 x 203 SP Btl.)
ID They had a heavy artillery regt (all Btls were 155mm). Also being one of the Vietnam divisions had a very experiencied cadre of officiers and soldiers.
6th ID had double TOW tubes.
8th ID had a heavy artillery Rgt all 155mm.
Artillery Brigade (1 x 130mm MLRS Btl , 1 x 203 SP Btl , 1 x 203 T Btl.)
Special Assault Regiment. ADA Btl.
AT Co jeep mounted TOW.
706th Special Assault Regiment. Honest John Tactical Rocket Btl. ADA Btl.
Artillery Brigade (1 x 130mm MLRS Btl , 2 x 203 SP Btls, 1 x 203 T Btl , 1 x 75 SP Btl.) 6th
This Corps was missing. It had 20th
Mech Infantry Div (attached to VI Corps in stock) and the Capital Mech Infantry Div. This Corps were in reserve ready to block any penetration, fielding 2 armored brigades and 4 Mechanized brigades.
Capital Mech Infantry Div. 707th Special Assault Regiment.
Artillery Brigade (1 x 130mm MLRS Btl , 4 x 155 SP Btls.) 2 x MLRS Btls.
Mech Inf Div: Mech divs had 2 Mech brigades with 2 Mech inf Btls and a tank Btl plus an armored Bde with 2 tank Btls and 1 Mech inf Btl.
All artillery were SP. ADA was a Btl sized group instead of company sized and Engineers were mounted on tracked vehicles. Mech Bdes were issued more TOW missiles than Infantry divisions.
Corrected Artillery support: stock has 24 artillery Btls, sources show 16. Missing all of their Army level formations:
11th Infantry Div.
3rd Armored Brigade. 1107th
Mobilization Reserve Divisions: 62nd
702nd Special Assault Regiment. Separate Armor Btl.
Artillery Brigade (1 x 130mm MLRS Btl , 2 x 203 T Btls, 4 x 155 T Btls.) 2nd
Engineer Brigade (6 x engineer Btl)
Special Assault Regiment. Separate Armor Btl.
Anti-tank co (jeep mounted TOW) ADA Btl.
Artillery Brigade (1 x 130mm MLRS Btl , 2 x 203 T 3 x 155 T Btls, TA Btl.) 3rd Engineer Brigade (6 x engineer Btl.)
Infantry division had a single tank company. Their ADA was equipped with L60/70 40mm.
Special Assault Btl. Separarate Armor Btl.
Anti-tank Co jeep mounted TOW. ADA Btl.
Artillery Brigade (1 x 130mm MLRS Btl , 2 x 155 T Btls, TA Btl,) 1170th Engineer Brigade (3x engineer Btls,)
Assault Amphibious Btls were the only with AAAV7/LVT (ROKA had only enough for 2 Btls) Also the Btls were quite bigger, almost the size of USMC.
US Forces Korea
Replacements added with greater emphasis on men (2-4%) than on vehicles / artillery (1%)
Wickham exempted the 2d Infantry Division from conversion to either the heavy or light configuration because of its mission in Korea, the absence of a corps organization there, and Korean augmentation assigned to it. Eighth Army devised a unique structure for the 2d that increased its firepower, especially the artillery and the antiarmor capabilities, and provided a mix of light and heavy maneuver battalions. The division was planned to field two armor, two Mechanized infantry, and two air assault infantry battalions. However by 1985 it had 2 Mech infantry (should be M2 Bradley but they arrived quite later) Btls, 2 armor Btls and 4 infantry Btls (motorized) in a mix from older plans (ROAD, Division-86, AoE) up finally AirLand battle plans.
Aviation Brigade organic UH-60 was the 2nd
Btl (missing), while 4-7 Cavalry was a mix of M60, infantry on M-113 and heliborne infantry until 1988.
Aviation Attack Helicopters were 24 strong not 18.
Divisional Artillery had 4 artillery Btls and 2 batteries of MLRS (6-37 and 1-38) All m109 SP Art Btl were equipped with 24 guns.
A third Vulcan and Chaparral companies were missing in the ADA Btl.
---9th Infantry Division.
From 1983 become High-Technology Test-Bed (HTTB). Fielded M551 Sheridan tanks because AGS vehicles were not available. Initially the vision was to create three motorized brigades with three new types of infantry battalion:
• Light Attack Battalion (HMMWV GL Mk 19-TOW.)
• Combined Arms Battalion Light (1x M551 Sheridan + HMMWV-TOW/GL Mk 19 company
+ 2x light motorized infantry companies with HMMWV GL Mk 19. Plus Mortar company, scouts section, TOW platoon.)
• Combined Arms Battalion Heavy (2x M551 Sheridan + HMMWV-TOW/GL Mk 19 company + 1x light motorized infantry companies with HMMWV GL Mk 19. Plus Mortar company, scouts section, TOW platoon.)
brigade fielded one of each of the three new battalions.
brigade fielded 2 combined arms battalions heavy and the 2-77th
Armor. (The division did only activated four of the envisioned five combined arms battalions heavy and retained the 2-77th Armor instead.)
brigade fielded one light and one heavy combined arms battalion and a light attack Btl. 9th
Cavalry Brigade had two attack helicopter battalions and one cavalry squadron.
The division artillery consisted of three battalions equipped with M198 155mm towed howitzers, one light artillery battalion with M102 105mm towed howitzers and a battery with M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems. (not a full Btl). Also had a ADA Btl.
9th Infantry Division (Motorized),
• 1st Brigade
• 2nd Light Attack Battalion, 1st Infantry
• 2nd Combined Arms Battalion Heavy, 23rd Infantry
• 4th Combined Arms Battalion Light, 23rd Infantry
• 2nd Combined Arms Battalion Heavy, 60th Infantry
• 3rd Combined Arms Battalion Heavy, 60th Infantry
• 2nd Battalion, 77th Armor
• 2nd Light Attack Battalion, 2nd Infantry
• 2nd Combined Arms Battalion Heavy, 47th Infantry
• 3rd Combined Arms Battalion Light, 47th Infantry
9th Cavalry Brigade (Air Attack)
• 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry
• 9th Aviation Battalion
• 268th Attack Helicopter Battalion
• Company A, 214th Aviation Battalion
• 2nd Battalion, 4th Field Artillery
• 1st Battalion, 11th Field Artillery
• 3rd Battalion, 34th Field Artillery
• 1st Battalion, 84th Field Artillery
• Battery E, 333rd Field Artillery
• 1st Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery
• 15th Engineer Battalion
Light Infantry Division.
All Light Infantry divisions (under the 10k signature) had no tanks nor APC.
The division artillery consisted of three towed 105mm howitzer battalions, three batteries with six howitzers each and one battery of 155mm howitzers fielding eight pieces (I Corps had attached another 18 155mm howitzer Btl, that's the Corps Augmenting.)
Infantry firepower was enhanced since all the division had night vision capability.
Deleted 3-8 Cav Sqn. The first unit to mix Bradley and M1 tanks were the 1st
Cavalry Rgt by 1986. In their place would be 3-4 Cav but after 25th
Division went into light transformation they gave it away to a heavy division.
Third Brigade was added.
Aviation Brigade had 2 heliborne infantry companies.
Division was part of III MAF (Marine Amphibious Force) alog with 1st
MAW. (Marine Air Wing)
Marines. LAI Btl Recon Btl
MAW (includes HMLA unit)
Marines had 4 Btls and were augmented with 2 batteries of 203mm sp.
The track Btl was Armor Assault Btl with assault infantry and LAV vehicles in addition to M60 tanks.
Air Force was not in Korea, their base was Japan. It was the 314th
Air Division until 1986, when 7th
Air Force was reactivated. Until that moment this division served under 5th
Air Force (Japan.)
Counterterrosim 18x A-37B
Notice A-10 defense is much higher than ALT, that's because A-10 is quite resistent to AA gun artillery fire and less to heavy SAM missiles. By 1985 NKPA had almost 8000 AA gun artillery and few SAM missiles (SA-2 and SA-3 which were fixing protecting the nation vital industries, capital and supply depots)
Replacements added with greater emphasis on men (2-6%) than on vehicles-artillery (1-3%)
NKPA better value is due their excellent and integrated replacement system that were organic to formations, with a experienced cadre following the divisions/brigades into battle.
Missing and Corrections on Formations.
All Army Groups (Corps in Stock-ALT) and 2nd
Echelon Corps troops are missing: Recon bureau SF Btl
ATGM Btl (AT-1 Snapper)
SP AT guns Btl (mounted on VTT-323 chasis) Some of their engineer assets
160mm mortar Btls.
Artillery attached to Army Groups (renamed Corps in early 90s) consisted in two brigades, 1 SP and 1 MLRS, with a grand total of 200+ guns (vs 153 in stock/alt). Each one with 6 Btls of artillery.
I Army Group had two Light infantry brigades instead of 1.
II-V Army Group had three Light infantry brigades instead of 2. II Army Group had 5 ID asigned instead of 4.
Second Echeleon Corps had 4 infantry divisions in each one instead of 3.
Second Echeleon Corps armored brigades had not Light tank Btl and their ADA was Btl size instead of Rgt like DMZ/Mech Command units. Their tank Btls were equipped with T54/55 instead of T-62. Their artillery units were a single SP Btl.
All Infantry divisions were missing their AA 37mm and 57mm towed guns plus the 120mm mortar btl in the Artillery Rgt.
All DMZ Infantry divisions were missing in their divisional artillery a third 122mm artillery Btl. All DMZ Infantry Division had a full ADA Rgt instead of a Btl.
All DMZ Infantry Division had a 100mm SP AT gun company mounted in a VTT-323 chasis. All DMZ Infantry Division had a full Btl of MLRS in every Regiment instead of a battery per regiment.
2nd Echelon Infantry Divisions were missing their mortar Btl in the artillery Rgt.
All Light infantry were SF not line infantry, their weapons were quite lighter: 18x 60mm mortars instead of 15x 120/82mm mortars, 3 times less RPG-7, no Recoiless Rifles or ATGM, 10 times less RDP heavy MG. No ADA assets. In combat their main strength were night fighting and assaults.
Trained to the max, indoctrinated and highly skilled, thus all SF are A quality. For pure simplicity all different names received by SF brigades are resumed as Light Infantry (They had Navy sniper, Airborne Sniper, Sniper, River assault, Light infantry, Recon bureau, Special missions.)
There are 151 SF Btls in the game, all as attacker role: DMZ Army Groups 81, Mechanized Command 2, VII Special Corps 24, 2nd
Special Corps (called 7th
special purpose corps in stock) gathered all SF not assigned to other formations. I haven't found nothing about combined brigades of special forces, armor and engineers
so the Corps is a pure SF corps.
NKPA reserves consisted in 27 PTU
Infantry divisions. Those divisions had older equippment and their training was not that sharp. Part of them were intended to replace regular divisions in their responsibility areas so they could be sent to the front, others would be employed as front troops (sort of Third Echelon), the final part would be used as replacements to replenish forward divisions (hence their high replacements rate)
As said above (see General) NKPA had no Mechanized and Armored Corps, NKPA had a Mechanized Command with:
3x Motorized Rifle divs.
2x Tank divs (Yu Kyong-Su's 105th Seoul Guards div [commander of the division when they conquered Seoul by the 50s] and Koksan div [ID as per location of the divisions, real denomination unknown]
5x Tank Bdes.
2x Independent Tank regt.
It was by 1989 when III, VI and VIII Corps finalized their conversion of Mechanized and Armored Corps.
Motorized Rifle divs were composed of: 1x Tank Btl
3x Motorized Inf Rgts (each one with 3 Btls and 1 SP 120mm mortar Btl) 2x 122mm SP Art Btl
1x 130mm SP Art Btl 1x 152mm SP Art Btl
1x 107mm SP MLRS battery 1x SP ADA Rgt
2x Engineer Btls 1x Recon Btl
Tank Divisions were composed of:
1x Armored Brigade with: ( like the other but for vintage BA-64/BTR-40 in the recon company)***
3x Tank Btls
1x Mech Inf Btl
1x 122mm SP Art Btl 1x 152mm SP Art Btl
1x 107mm SP MLRS battery 1x SP ADA Rgt
1x Recon company (vintage BA-64/BTR-40) 1x Engineer Btl
1x Independent Tank Rgt
1x Mechanized Brigade (there were only 2 in the NKPA) with 3x Mech Inf Btls
1x Tank Btl
2x 122mm SP Art Btl 1x 152mm SP Art Btl
1x 120mm SP Mortar Btl 1x 107mm MLRS battery
1x SP ADA Btl 1x SP AT gun Btl
1x Recon company (vintage BA-64/BTR-40) 1x Engineer company.
1x Engineer Btl
1x Recon Btl (vintage BA-64/BTR-40) 1x SF Btl
1x Artillery Rgt (1 gun Btl, 1 MLRS Btl) 1x ADA Btl
***Armored Brigades missing the following assets: the SP ADA Btl, a 107mm SP MLRS battery, an artillery regiment with an additional SP 152mm Btl and a recon company. (Light tanks were 41 instead of 39)
Tanks and AFV.
NKPA had about 900 T-62 tanks and 1900 T54/55, Armored brigades were equipped with T54/55 instead of T-62, while not all Infantry divisions from the second echelon had a tank Btl.
Mechanized Brigades used only VTT-323, BTR-40/50/152 were reserved for motorized infantry and light brigades.
A T-62 variant called Chonma-ho (Pegasus) has a 125mm gun, a heavy AA MG and improved armor. About 420 of those were available by 1985, concentrated in the Mechanized Command's tank divisions.
Only 325 Light Tanks (PT-85 and Type 62) were in the inventory, that's enough for 8 Btls, 4 of them were under the Army Group's Armored Brigades. The rest were under Mechanized Command.
VTT-323 AIFV had not AT-3 ATGM until 1992, so no range 2 nor high HA values. VTT-323 Mech Btls had 550 men instead of 350.
NKPA had no Artillery Corps yet but 2 Artillery Divisions (620th
and Kangdong) with plenty of Artillery brigades. Guns (including SP Artillery Btls) and MLRS were into separate brigades. Every division had 6 brigades for a grand total of 1008 (152mm, 130mm and 122mm) guns and 630 MLRS (122mm, 200mm and 240mm heavy rockets) instead of 504 mixed.
Strategic Artillery Brigade were in fact 3 brigades.Those gun were able to reach Seoul. There were 500 by 1988 (production started in 1978) so an average of 50 per year. By 1985 about 300-350 should be available.
Second Echelon Corps artillery was composed of MLRS and Mortars. All the gun artillery was in the front (but for vintage Soviet WWII guns like the 76mm.)
The 122mm artillery is a mix of M-30 and D-74 so the average range is 11 miles. DMZ Army Groups artillery were much powerful than Corps ones (12 vs 6 Btls.) 152mm Howitzer Btls have 18 guns now instead of 12.
NKPA had by 1985 54 FROG 3/5 SSM launchers.
The ubiquitous Strela (SA-7) due to its poor kinematic performance and vulnerability to even the most primitive infra-red countermeasures and poor lethality was very poor against aircrafts, even those thit managed to return safely to base because of its small warhead. The Strela is suitable for use against helicopters and prop-driven transports, but not combat jets.
For example: In Yom Kippur Arab forces of all countries fired around 5,000 SA-7 missiles but destroyed only two Israeli aircraft and damaged 26 others who returned to base and were quickly repaired. At Afghanistan
while 42 helicopters were shot down by various Strela variants (until exhaust shrouds made them next to invisible to the short-wavelength Strela seeker) only five fixed- wing aircraft were destroyed with the weapon, This is reflected by low SA values.
NKPA had a 14.5mm towed MG at regimental level (ZPU-2/4) so it's now factorized into Infantry AA value. Those were regimental assets, not divisional ones. (they wouldn't be used to protect artillery in the rear but advancing infantry.)
SP ZSU 57/2 were not available by 1985 (they were available by 1992), the only SP ADA available were the ZPU2-4 mounted. In 1985 they used just towed 37mm and 57mm guns. 85mm and 100mm also, but static in the mainland along SAM Brigades. Some batteries were forward to protect DMZ. (represented by SAM Sites)
Anti-air artillery have not HA or SA values NKPA wouldn't risk their ADA firing at ground targets while the USAF-ROKAF jets and helicopers are pounding their most preciated assets: the artillery. Every Artillery brigade under Artillery Divisions had an ADA Btl.
Older Mig aircraft had a negligible ground support capacity. Even not taking into account the much modern and lethal ROK-USFK AA net. Being vastly inferior to ROK-USFK it's really hard to think on MIG-15 (good weather, day jet) from 1950 surpassing ROK-USFK missile umbrella, avoiding F-16, Radars, Redeyes, Stingers and Vulcans to deliver a very weak payload. Instead those older aircraft would be used to intercept ROK-USFK trying to destroy their artillery, supply system, vanguard forces, tanks columns etc.
NKPA had some ground attack aircrafts, those were the IL-28 bomber, Q-5 Fantan (Mig-19 Chinese conversion to ground attack role) and SU-7 ground attack aircraft.
Due fuel shortages since 1980 NKPA Air Forces flew an average of 32 hours per year, affecting their combat performance. Their Air Forces are rated as D.
NKPA attack flight units were divided and lowered to 10 aircrafts to generate more chances of bypassing ROK-US Air Interception and when that does happen lessening the effect instead of nothing or 27 bombers hit the target.
Brian Taehyun Kim - Republic of Korea Army & Republic of Korea Armed Forces. Charles T. Kamps, Jr. - Accross the DMZ: The Next War in Korea.
David Willis - Aerospace Encyclopedia of World Air Forces. Gary McNiesh, Lt. Col. - Combined Aviation Force in ROK. Homer Hodge - North Korea’s Military Strategy.
James Dennis - HARTS in North Korea.
James D. Marett, Maj. - ROK Light Infantry Divisions. John Gordon IV, Maj. - ROK Artillery Present And Future. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. - North Korean Special Forces.
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. - The Armed Forces of North Korea. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. - Shield of the Great Leader.
John Sullivan - Two Koreas on future,
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Stephen Goose - Comparative military capabilities of north korea and south Korean armed forces. Terence Roehrig - From Deterrence to Engagement: The U.S. Defense Commitment to South Korea.
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IBP Inc - Korea South Army Weapon Systems Handbook Volume 1 Many many websites.