a) Strategy
b) Tactical
c) Officers / NCO (leadership, bravery)
d) Soldiers (bravery, training...)
e) equipment (2 pdr. At gun - wtf. Did they use the 25pdr. as At gun with good effect? Cruiser tanks etc..)
f) numbers ( had the brits in this years more numbers esp. i´m talking about air, arty and tanks)
a) fair to excellent
b) excellent to utterly misguided (indeed, the same tactic was at different times either excellent or utterly misguided. Eg, Jock Columns were an excellet expedient in mid-41, but utterly misguided during CRUSADER and at any time in 1942). Biggest failing was in getting a working comined-arms approach in general use.
c) same as any other country.
d) same as any other country.
e) 2 pdr was an excellent A-Tk gun against the vast majority of armour it faced until mid-late 1942, and an adequate A-Tk gun in most circumstances until the end of the war in NA. It was superior to the German 37mm, for example. Similarly, the 6-pr was superior to the German 50mm, and the 17-pr was better than the German 88mm.
Yes, 25-prs were often used very effectively against German armour, as you should be aware from all the books you say you've read. However, the problem with using 25-prs as A-Tk guns in the desert was two-fold. Firstly, it distracted them from their core role of providing indirect fire support. Secondly, it was very much a do-or-die proposition. By the time the German tanks were within effective range, there was only a few minutes before the guns had to be withdrawn or fight and die where they stood. Attempting to w/d after the German tanks were close engough to engage with their own HE and MGs was utterly futile. Often batterys and regiments went down fighting because they delayed the decision to withdraw too long, or were surprised and never really had the opportunity to w/d.
For example: http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH...c7-11.html
British A-Tk defences often failed because they were trying to play Paper or Scissors or Rock, while the Germans were playing Paper and Scissors and Rock. In concrete terms: A-Tk weapons often have to wait until ~500m before they can effectively engage enemy tanks. British A-Tk defence to often rested on A-Tk guns alone, which are easy meat to a combined tank-infantry-MG-[and especially] artillery attack. Conversely, German A-Tk defence often rested on layered guns, tanks, and artillery.
Brit/CW artillery was generally much better organised and handled (Feb-Jul 1942 excepted) than the Germans, and in the 25-pr they had the best-in-breed. However, 8th Army never had a very strong medium or heavy artillery park.
Tank wise, the British tanks were ok, but hampered by dodgy doctrine. Amroured cars were again ok, but were on the whole very well handled within their assigned role of recce, and very numerous.
The LRDG was phenomenally effective in it's recce role, given the resources assigned to it.
Brit/CW aircraft were ok, and from CRUSADER onwards were able to provide superior ground support, and from about Aug 42 onwards were just better in all areas to the GAF.
Logistically the British/CW were head, shoulders, nipples, belly button, testicles, and knees above the Germans. That is in terms of resources, tonnages, organisation, all-round effectiveness, or any other measure you care to name.
f) numbers wise, 8th Army was generally more numerous, by any measure. But it can be difficult to do comparisons due to the different ways the three different belligerents counted noses.
Regards
Jon